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Extending  Dunning’s Investment Development Path: 




The aim of this paper is to investigate the home country determinants of outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) from post-communist economies. In particular, we address three research 
objectives: First, we put forward a novel conceptual framework,  extending  Dunning’s Investment 
Development Path (IDP) (Dunning, 1981,1986,1988) by incorporating institutional variables, 
drawing on institutional theory (North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Wright et al., 
2005). Second, we test this new conceptual framework using a panel data set of twenty post-
communist economies for fifteen years (1996-2010). Third, we put forward several  contributions to  
theory and practice. We present below the justification for our paper. 
Firstly, recent years have seen an increase in outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from 
emerging markets and post-communist economies alike (UNCTAD, 2011; Luo et al., 2010; da 
Silva et al., 2009). Given the specific institutional fabric of these countries (JIM, 2010), the question 
is whether mainstream theory can explain the drivers of OFDI outflows or whether new theories are 
needed to explain this phenomenon (Zhang and Dally, 2011; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; 
Kalotay, 2008; Liu et al., 2005). For example, patterns of OFDI from Russia challenge the 
propositions of the Uppsala School and the Investment Development Path (IDP) and indicate the 
need to extend the eclectic paradigm (OLI) to include home country institutions (Kalotay and 
Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay, 2008). Moreover, Buckley et al. (2007:499) argue that in order to 
explain Chinese outward FDI, three special explanations (capital market imperfection, special 
ownership advantages and institutional factors) need to be ‘nested within the general theory of the 
multinational firm’.  
We follow Ramasamy et al. (2012) and  Buckley et al. (2007) according to whom rather 
than rejecting conventional theories, specific modifications are needed to explain OFDI from 
emerging economies. The recent increase in FDI from emerging and  post-communist economies 
suggests that these countries have reached levels of economic development and competitiveness 
that allow them to generate OFDI. In other words, based on the economic development and 
competitiveness of the home country, local firms have developed ownership advantages that allow 
them to expand successfully aboard.  However, the IDP alone does not explain the surge in OFDI 
for countries that are technically in stage 2 of their investment development path (Kalotay and 
Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay, 2008). IDP does not account for the ownership advantages of firms that 
are ‘embedded’ in the institutional context of their home country and that allow multinational 
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enterprises (MNEs) to overcome the ‘liability of foreignness’ when expanding abroad. This 
suggests extending the IDP by drawing on institutional theory and accounting for differences in the 
home countries’ institutional context. By augmenting the IDP to explore the home country 
institutional determinants of OFDI from post-communist economies we answer calls by Peng et al. 
(2008), Dunning and Lundan (2008) and Eden (2010) for International Business research to focus 
more on institutions. This is our first contribution to theory.  
Secondly, in line with Meyer and Peng (2005),  we believe that through their distinctive 
institutional context,  the  Central and  Eastern European countries (CEECs)
1
 represent an ideal 
context to test the applicability of extant theories  and to develop new ones by  exploring the role of 
home country institutional determinants in explaining OFDI. For the most part of the last two 
decades these countries have been known as ‘transition economies’ (EBRD, 2010), a distinctive 
group of countries (Meyer and Peng, 2005). These countries share the communist legacy and the 
radical challenges of the political and economic transformation that followed the fall of 
Communism (Meyer and Peng, 2005). Furthermore, many of the transition reforms have continued 
even after EU membership and are still in progress, especially in the Commonwealth of the 
Independent States (CIS) and the South-Eastern European countries (EBRD, 2011).  These reforms 
have affected considerably the institutional environment and business strategy in the CEECs (Meyer 
and Peng, 2005), highlighting the need to account for institutional factors when investigating the 
determinants of OFDI from this geographical area. 
Furthermore, the CEECs are distinctive from other emerging economies (UNCTAD, 2011; 
Meyer and Peng, 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Andreff (2003) argues that, although there are 
commonalities between transition economies across various geographical areas, MNEs from 
[European] transition economies are distinct from third world multinationals. They have different 
drivers and have different starting points for their internationalisation process. This makes 
comparisons through longitudinal studies difficult, as third world multinationals have reached 
higher stages of internationalisation than [European] transition economies and  some emerging 
economies are in a later stage of the IDP than the CEECs  (Andreff, 2003). Furthermore, due 
China’s specific  institutional characteristics -such as it’s one party system, its reliance on state 
owned enterprises, its guanxi and Confucianism, its size, its different reforms path (Peng el al, 
2008) and its heavily regulated economy (Kang and Jiang, 2012)- comparisons between the CEECs 
and China -another ‘transition economy’- area also challenging.  According to  Demekas (2007), 
European emerging markets are different from other emerging economies because they have 
different economic fundamentals and different policy challenges. Moreover, unlike other emerging 
economies, their post-communist transformation has been influenced dramatically by their 
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economic and political relations with the European Union, including the accession to the EU  or the 
prospect of such membership. Political stability, economic convergence and the liberalisation of 
trade and capital brought by the quest for EU membership have also affected OFDI from these 
countries (Demekas, 2007; Andreff, 2003).  Furthermore, emerging European economies are more 
advanced than other emerging economies with regard to institutional factors such as democracy, 
rule of law, intellectual property rights, regulation quality and financial sector development 
(Demekas, 2007). All these institutions are likely to affect directly or indirectly OFDI, thus limiting 
the applicability of extant research on emerging economies to the CEECs (Pananond, 2007; Klein 
and Wöcke, 2007). Moreover, at present there is a lack of cross-country studies of determinants of 
OFDI from post-communist economies and this study aims to fill this gap. 
 By focusing  on the CEECs we are able to clarify the boundaries of extant theories, test the 
limits of the applicability of the IDP to a specific context  and demonstrate the need to extend the 
IDP by drawing on institutional theory.  This is our second contribution to theory. In particular, we 
show that overall institutional reforms and competition reforms  increase the competitiveness of the 
home country and enhance OFDI. In doing so we consolidate and extend existing theory (Meyer 
and Peng, 2005) and answer the call by Liu et al. (2005) to identify other factors that complement 
GDP per capita as a reflection of home country development. This is also an empirical contribution 
of this study. 
Thirdly, whilst OFDI can lead to depletion of resources in the home country (Witt and 
Lewin, 2007), it is also associated with increased home competitiveness (Zhao et al., 2010), country 
exports and jobs (Kalotay, 2004) and hence economic benefits (JIM, 2010; Globeram and Shapiro, 
2008; Svetlicic and Rojec, 2003). Thus, investigating the determinants of OFDI allows us to 
highlight several implications for policy makers so that OFDI is encouraged responsibly. This is our 
contribution to practice. 
Thus, we address several  gaps in the literature and make several important contributions: 
firstly, we augment the IDP framework by incorporating institutional theory; secondly,  we conduct 
a cross- country empirical analysis of home country determinants of OFDI from post-communist 
economies, analysis  that allows us to test and augment extant theory and to identify specific 
institutional factors that affect OFDI from post-communist economies; finally, we put forward 
policy implications. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: we first present the 
literature review, followed by our conceptual framework and our methodology; we then discuss our 
results, followed by conclusions, including implications for theory, and implications for policy 




2. Literature review 
2.1. The determinants of OFDI from emerging economies  
Extant literature on the determinants of OFDI from emerging economies varies in focus and 
approaches. A lot of discussion focuses on OFDI from the largest originators of outward FDI such 
as China (Kang and Jiang, 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Cui et al, 2011; Zhang and Dally, 2011; 
Tolentino, 2010; Voss et al., 2010; Boateng et al., 2008; Mork et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2007), 
India (Bhaumik and Driffield, 2011; Hattari and Rajan, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Nayyar, 2008; Luo 
and Tung, 2007), Russia (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay, 2008). However, there is a lack of 
multi-country studies that can highlight how home country factors influence outward FDI.  
Although many studies are of qualitative nature (Eren-Erdogmus et al., 2010; Cui and Jiang, 
2010; Voss et al., 2010; Gammeltoft et al., 2010; da Silva et al., 2009; Saez and Chang, 2009; 
Kalotay, 2008), or focus on firm level data (Wang et al., 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Bhaumik 
and Driffield, 2011; Tan and Meyer, 2010; da Silva et al., 2009), recent papers conduct country 
level quantitative analysis to ascertain the determinants of OFDI from emerging economies. Most 
OFDI data used in extant studies represents bilateral outflows, allowing for an in-depth 
investigation of the impact of host country variables on OFDI (Kolstag and Wiig, 2012; Goh and 
Wong, 2011; Zhang and Dally, 2011; Chou et al., 2011; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Buckley et 
al., 2007).   
A smaller group of authors acknowledge the significant impact of home country variables 
on OFDI (Appendix A). Extant studies account for home country macro-economic indicators 
(Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Tolentino, 2010; Goh and Wong, 2011; Buckley et al., 2007; 
Pantelidis and Kyrkilis, 2003; Andreff, 2002)  or  include home country development- related 
indicators (Andreff, 2002; Pantelidis and Kyrkilis, 2003; Liu et al., 2005). Several papers account 
for home country institutional factors. Kang and Jiang (2012) find that institutional distance related 
to economic freedom, political influence or FDI restriction affects the location of Chinese OFDI. 
Furthermore, the determinants of Chinese OFDI depend on whether the target economy is a 
developed economy or an emerging one.  Wang et al. (2012) examine the drivers of Chinese OFDI 
integrating and testing insights from institutional theory, industrial organisation  and the resource-
based view of the firm. They find that government support and  home country industrial structure 
are crucial in explaining Chinese OFDI, whereas technological and advertising resources are less 
important. However, given the unique characteristics of the Chinese economy highlighted earlier, 
the findings of the two studies above cannot be extrapolated to other transition economies and 
specific investigations are required.  
Goh and Wong (2011) show that the liberalisation of Malaysia’s capital outflows increases 
OFDI. However, this study uses the foreign exchange reserves as a proxy for the liberalisation 
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policy, thus capturing a very limited aspect of the home institutional environment. Kalotay and 
Sulstarova (2010) find that the policy changes in the Russian Federation have affected Russian 
outward FDI. However, their study focuses on Russian mergers and acquisitions (M&As) abroad 
rather than all aggregate OFDI and also uses a dummy to capture the impact of policies on OFDI. 
Furthermore, they apply the OLI paradigm by testing the impact of Oa (privileged access to 
income-generating assets) and Ot advantages (transaction based intangible assets) (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008a, b), rather than Oi advantages (institutional based assets) (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008a, b) as such. Using a data set comprising both emerging economies and post-communist 
countries, Salehizadeh (2007) shows that there is a positive relationship between economic freedom 
and political transparency on the one hand and OFDI on the other hand. However, this study only 
focuses on bi-variate relationships, highlighting the need for an in-depth cross-country  
investigation of the determinants of OFDI from emerging countries and post-communist economies 
in particular. Finally, Buckley et al. (2007) find that policy liberalisation has had a significant 
impact on Chinese outward FDI, highlighting the importance of institutions as an OFDI 
determinant. However, this study focuses on Chinese OFDI only and uses a dummy to capture 
institutional change rather than employing continuous or interval specific institutional variables. 
Overall, we believe that more in depth investigation with regard to the impact of the home 
country institutions on OFDI is needed, using more specific institutional variables and allowing for 
cross-country comparison across time. The ownership advantages are ‘embedded’ in MNEs’ home 
countries (Tolentino, 2010; Erramilli et al., 1997; Dunning, 1980), including the home country 
institutions or institutional reforms (JIM, 2010; Cheng et al., 2009; Andreff, 2002). Our study 
makes a novel contribution to extant literature by extending the IDP drawing on institutional theory 
and examining how specific institutional reforms such as trade and foreign exchange liberalisation, 
privatisation, enterprise restructuring, competition reforms or overall institutional change affect 
OFDI. Despite their relevance to creating the ‘rules of the game’ in emerging (and transition) 
economies, these particular institutional factors have not previously been analysed in the literature. 
Instead, previous literature has accounted for policy change using dummies (Kalotay and 
Sulstarova, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007), proxies (Goh and Wong, 2011) or has used alternative 
measures of institutional factors (Salehizadeh, 2007), such as the ICRG risk variables, for example 
(Kang and Jiang, 2012). Furthermore, more studies into the determinants of OFDI from the CEECs 
are necessary as they have a specific institutional context, as explained earlier. We review below 
several transition economies studies that are the building block for our investigation.  
 
2.2. The determinants of OFDI from post-communist economies 
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Although the fall of Communism has led to considerable research on transition economies 
(Lavigne, 1999, 2000; Stiglitz, 1999; Kodolko, 2000) studies on determinants of OFDI from the 
CEECs are scarce and vary in focus and approaches. Some papers use firm level data (Damijan et 
al., 2007; Blanke-Ławinczk, 2009), others focus on country level analysis (Rugraff, 2010; Kalotay, 
2004; Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė, 2005; Andreff, 2002). We review briefly the country level 
studies- as these are most relevant to our investigation.  
In a cross-country qualitative study, Rugraff (2010) compares the FDI paths of four CEECs 
countries- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. He finds that foreign affiliates are 
pivotal in enhancing OFDI from the Czech Republic and Hungary, Polish OFDI is driven by state-
owned extractive and infrastructure companies whilst private indigenous-grown multinationals 
drive OFDI from Slovenia (Rugraff, 2010). Comparing Lithuania and Estonia, Ginevičius and 
Tvaronavičienė (2005) identify several patterns of inward and outward foreign direct investment 
and state that there are significant differences between the two countries. Using country level 
statistics, Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė (2005) focus mainly on external factors that enhance 
OFDI. They find that Estonian OFDI is driven by the search for larger markets that allow 
economies of scale and scope and is facilitated by geography and historical ties (Ginevičius and 
Tvaronavičienė, 2005). They also distinguish between OFDI carried out by domestic Estonian 
companies and OFDI carried out by affiliates of MNEs that use Estonia as a springboard for 
expanding in neighbouring countries such as Lithuania (Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė, 2005). 
However, these studies are exploratory and limited to a few countries only. This highlights the need 
for more in depth, cross-country explanatory research into the determinants of OFDI from post-
communist economies. 
In a cross-country qualitative study, and adopting the terminology of Dunning’s (1981, 
1986, 1988) Investment Development Path, Kalotay (2004) discusses the drivers of OFDI from 
Central and Eastern European countries. The study notes that the region is in stage 2 of the IDP - 
with the notable exception of the Russian Federation that is in stage 3- and stresses the importance 
of EU integration and government policies, including privatisation and liberalisation, in enhancing 
outward FDI (Kalotay, 2004). Kalotay (2005) also finds that the geographical location, cultural and 
personal ties, as well as the knowledge of neighbouring countries facilitate OFDI, especially for 
Estonian, Hungarian and Slovenian enterprises. Furthermore, Kalotay (2005) argues that OFDI is a 
means to achieve competitiveness in the absence of a large home market. This study is exploratory 
and thus paves the way for more in depth explanatory research into the home country determinants 
of OFDI from the CEECs.  
Applying the IDP framework in a study of the ‘new multinationals from transition 
countries’, Andreff (2002) finds that the major determinants of outward FDI are the home country 
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level of economic development and the size of the home domestic market (proxied by population). 
The importance of the home country development confirms the IDP’s propositions, whilst the 
finding regarding the salience of home market size contradicts the literature according to which 
smaller countries generate more OFDI as MNEs search for larger markets (Varblene et al., 2001; 
Chudnovski and Lopez, 2000). Furthermore, Andreff (2002) finds that the sector structure of the 
home country is influential, but does not distinguish between ‘transition’ and emerging economies, 
whilst the technological level of the home country is not a strong determinant of OFDI. Andreff 
(2002) suggests that extant literature may have exaggerated the role of technology in encouraging 
OFDI and propose that more emphasis is given on the role of the industry restructuring in 
enhancing OFDI (Andreff, 2002). However, whilst Andreff (2002) argues that the 
internationalisation of ‘transition’ MNEs has been triggered by the process of privatisation, 
restructuring and modernisation in the home country, he does not account for these institutional 
factors in his model and does not explicitly explain how exactly these institutional changes foster 
OFDI.   
We believe that this complex set of institutional reforms adopted by the CEECs after the fall 
of Communism makes the CEECs an ideal context for testing and augmenting extant theory (as 
explained earlier). We extend the IDP by drawing on institutional theory and including in our 
conceptual framework and empirical investigation various institutional factors- such as trade and 
foreign exchange liberalisation, privatisation, enterprise restructuring, competition policy reforms 
and overall institutional reforms. In line with Meyer and Peng (2005), by focusing on the CEECs, 
we are able to test the applicability of extant theory to a new context, thus consolidating  (Meyer 
and Peng, 2005) as well as augmenting extant theory. We are also able to show how institutional 
factors affect strategy (Peng et al., 2008) by focusing on OFDI. In doing so we fill a gap in the 
literature and also make an empirical  contribution to the literature. 
We present a synopsis of extant literature in Figure 1 and Appendix B, followed by a 
discussion of our conceptual framework.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
 
3. Conceptual framework  
We argue that IDP alone does not explain the surge in outward foreign investment from post-
communist economies (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Kalotay, 2008), as the IDP does not account 
for the new multinationals’ (MNEs) ownership advantages that are ‘embedded’ in the institutional 
context of their home country (Andreff, 2002) and allow MNEs to overcome the ‘liability of 
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foreignness’ when expanding abroad. As outlined above, our conceptual framework complements 
hypotheses based on the IDP with hypotheses derived from institutional theory in an attempt to 
augment the IDP model and enhance its explanatory power with regard to the level of OFDI. Thus, 
our first set of hypotheses (H1a-c) draws on the IDP (Dunning, 1981, 1986, 1988), while our 
second set of hypotheses (H2a-e) integrates institutional theory (North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Meyer 
and Nguyen, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). We sum up our conceptual framework in Figure 2 and  
explain the argumentation of our hypotheses below. 
 
Insert Figure 2  here.  
 
3.1. IDP and OFDI determinants 
Dunning’s (1981, 1986, 1988) IDP, an extension of the eclectic paradigm, (Dunning, 1977, 1998, 
2001) is the most developed theory explaining simultaneously both inward and outward FDI (Stoian 
and Filippaios, 2008a) and has been followed up by several economists (Dunning and Narula, 1998; 
Durán and Ubeda, 2001; Durán and Ubeda, 2005). According to the IDP, the outward and inward 
FDI of a country depend on the country’s level of economic development (measured by its GDP per 
capita), leading countries to follow a predictable path that consists of five stages. In stage 1 a less 
developed economy neither attracts, nor generates FDI. In stage 2, industrialising developing 
economies attract FDI through their improved location advantages and perhaps generate minimum 
OFDI, leading to a negative net investment position (outward FDI-inward FDI). In stage 3, with the 
improvement of the country’s technological capabilities and the expansion of its domestic market, 
the country attracts significant FDI and generates OFDI based on its innovations and international 
specialisation. The net investment position remains negative. In stage 4, outward FDI is higher than 
inward FDI and the net investment position becomes positive. In stage 5, most advanced countries 
are characterised by a balanced net investment position with very high levels of both inward and 
outward FDI.  
Each stage of economic development is associated with certain location advantages that 
attract FDI as well as certain ownership advantages of local firms that enhance OFDI (Stoian and 
Filippaios, 2008a). Furthermore, the IDP assumes that inward FDI contributes to an improvement 
of the country’s location advantages and the local companies’ ownership advantages, thus 
enhancing both FDI and OFDI in the future. In this model stages 1 to 3 are associated with 
developing economies and 4 and 5 are associated with developed economies (Durán and Ubeda, 
2005). However, research shows that certain emerging economies have leapfrogged along the 
development path and have originated more OFDI than the path would have predicted (Kalotay, 
2008; Liu et al., 2007). 
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The development-related variables of the home country can be used to explain levels of 
OFDI. Firstly, according to the IDP (Dunning, 1981, 1986, 1988), there is a strong positive 
relationship between home country development level and outward FDI. This relationship is proven 
by further studies on developed countries (Barry et al., 2003; Bellak, 2001; Buckley and Castro, 
1998) or on a mix of developed and developing economies (Dunning and Narula, 1994; Tolentino, 
1993). Andreff (2002) also finds that outward FDI from transition and developing economies is a 
function of the home country’s level of economic development. With economic development come 
ownership advantages that domestic companies can exploit when investing abroad. These 
ownership advantages-embedded in the level of development of the home country- include higher 
capital availability, high productivity, specialised know-how and research and development, leading 
to increased ability to invest abroad (Durán and Ubeda, 2005). We thus formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1a: OFDI is positively associated with home country economic development. 
 
Secondly, the IDP model suggests that countries with larger technological endowments 
generate more OFDI, as local firms have access to more advanced technology that they can exploit 
as competitive advantages when internationalising (Lall,1996; Narula, 1996; Durán and Ubeda, 
2001). This link has received extensive theoretical and empirical support (Lall, 1980; Cantwell, 
1981,1987; Pearce, 1989; Kogut and Chang; 1991, Dunning, 1993), especially for developed 
economies. However, Andreff (2002) suggests that extant literature may have exaggerated the role 
of technology in encouraging OFDI and others find that the competitive advantages of EMNEs tend 
to be based on price competition rather than technology or brand (JIM, 2010). Furthermore, 
according to Salehizadeh (2007), some emerging economies multinationals have access to ‘lower 
level’ technologies and management practices that may be better suited to other emerging markets, 
thus enabling them to generate OFDI into similar economies. Accordingly, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: OFDI is positively associated with home country technological development. 
 
Thirdly, the IDP model suggests that (inward) FDI enhances OFDI. As a result of spill-
overs from FDI, local companies improve their ownership advantages and exploit these new 
ownership advantages through outward FDI (Dunning, 1981, 1986, 1988; Stoian and Filippaios, 
2008a; Durán and Ubeda, 2001). Moreover, affiliates of MNEs that invest in post-communist or 
emerging economies often expand abroad (Ruganoff, 2010; Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė, 2005), 
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or become regional centres for the MNEs’ operations in other similar countries (Rugraff, 2010; 
Stoian and Filippaios, 2008a,b), thus enhancing OFDI. We thus propose: 
 
H1c: OFDI is positively associated with inward foreign direct investment.  
 
3.2 Home-country institutional factors and OFDI 
According to Ramamurti (2009) and Khanna and Palepu (2006), emerging MNEs develop 
significant ownership advantages that they exploit when investing abroad in similar economies 
based on their capability to deal with institutional voids in their home countries. Moreover, Andreff 
(2002) argues that extant literature may have exaggerated the importance of technology in 
enhancing OFDI and that more attention should be paid to economic reforms such as privatisation 
and modernisation. Furthermore, Liu et al. (2005) argue that GDP per capita is an incomplete 
measure of economic development and thus supplementary factors that contribute to economic 
development should be included in the IDP. This suggests that to account for the increasing OFDI 
originating from emerging economies and transition economies, the IDP needs to be extended and 
incorporate institutional theory (North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Wright et al., 
2005). 
Institutional theory posits that the strategies of firms are embedded in the institutional 
context of their home country i.e. are influenced by the ‘rules of the game’ that are formally and 
informally enforced by the government and its agents (Scott, 2002). According to North (1990:3), 
institutions ‘are humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions’, also known as the 
‘rules of the game’ that provide the context within each organisations engage in production, 
exchange and distribution. Through isomorphism, i.e. by conforming to the rules, norms and 
expectations in their environments, organisations achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutions influence the firms’ strategies through regulative, normative 
and cognitive channels (Scott, 1995). As a result, MNEs’ strategic decisions reflect the institutional 
environments from their home country, i.e. display ‘institutional imprinting’ (North, 1990; Peng, 
2003; Cheng et al., 2009). Furthermore, this institutional ‘imprinting’ together with firm specific 
norms and values guiding the firm’s decision making constitute institutional ownership advantages 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008a,b) that can be transferred to host countries -alongside other with other 
competitive advantages-and can influence the institutional development of the host countries 
(Cantwell et al, 2010). In doing so, institutions and organisations co-evolve in close interaction 
(North, 1990; Kostova et al., 2008; Cantwell et al., 2010) and the ‘liability of foreignness’ is 
diminished (Cantwell et al., 2010). 
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Overall, we thus argue that MNEs from post-communist countries derive their ownership 
advantages not only from the level of economic development of their home country and its 
technological development, but also from the business environment of the home country and in 
particular the institutional context in which they operate (Peng et al., 2008). The ‘rules of the game’ 
at home offer these MNEs ownership advantages that they can exploit abroad in two ways: either 
when expanding in other emerging economies- due to the similarity of institutions and the EMNEs’ 
ability to take risks in uncertain institutional environments that mirror their home institutional 
fabrics -present or past- (Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008); or, when 
expanding in developed economies- by doing things differently, and hence differentiating 
themselves from their competitors. In doing so, emerging multinationals can turn institutional 
disadvantages into competitive advantages (da Silva et al., 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2006). 
Various institutional factors have been suggested to affect OFDI flows. Firstly, trade 
openness and liberalisation enhance OFDI (Blanke-Ławinczk, 2009; Kalotay, 2008, 2005). 
Buckley at al. (2007) find that both imports and exports between the home and the host country 
enhance OFDI. Imports generate new strategic resources that MNEs capitalise on through OFDI 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). An export-oriented economy allows local companies to learn about 
foreign markets and operating internationally. This leads to companies changing their mode of 
internationalisation from exporting to investing abroad (Kogut, 1983). Furthermore, to make the 
best of trade liberalisation, emerging multinationals set up subsidiaries abroad in order to control 
their markets or their supply chains (Kalotay, 2008:96). A similar pattern is followed by affiliates of 
MNEs that invest in emerging or transition economies and become regional centres (Rugraff, 2010; 
Stoian and Filippaios, 2008a,b). Furthermore, OFDI often occurs to provide a local support function 
for domestic exporters and help them improve their hard currency earnings (Wu and Sia, 2002). 
Finally, foreign exchange liberalisation also encourages OFDI (Goh and Wong (2011), as it eases  
exports, imports and investment. We thus formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: OFDI is positively associated with trade and foreign exchange liberalisation 
reforms. 
 
Secondly, existing research acknowledges the impact of institutional (or policy) change on 
OFDI (Luo et al., 2010; Saez and Chang, 2009; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Peng et al., 2008; 
Salehizadeh, 2007; Liu et al., 2005) but fails to discuss in depth how specific institutional reforms  
affect OFDI, focusing instead on general indicators of economic or political freedom (Kang and 
Jiang,2012) or on change in policy orientation (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007). 
Institutional building and reforms are typical for post- communist economies that, with the fall of 
 12 
Communism, have embarked on a process of transition from centrally planned economies to market 
economies (Stoian and Vickerman, 2006). According to Andreff (2002:377),  ‘privatisation, 
industrialisation and modernisation have often preceded and triggered [the developing and 
transition MNCs’] internationalisation’, a proposition that has not been tested empirically.  
Institutional reforms such as large scale privatisation and enterprise restructuring were 
interdependent processes necessary to overcome the legacy of Communism, change firm 
ownership, put in place the mechanisms of market economy, and increase the competitiveness of 
domestic firms, both locally and internationally (Stoian and Vickerman, 2006). Through 
privatisation local firms were able to strengthen their financial position and thus generate OFDI 
(Kalotay, 2004). Some companies were even listed on local stock exchanges, enabling them to raise 
additional capital and then invest abroad (Kalotay, 2004). Privatisation methods and pace affected 
the extent to which domestic firms had access to capital, know-how and technology and their 
capacity to compete both internally and externally. Through participation of foreign investors in the 
privatisation process, local firms were integrated in the network of various  multinationals and some 
of them became regional centres from which MNEs could expand further in other CEECs countries 
through OFDI (Rugraff, 2010; Stoian and Filippaios, 2008) as a result of the cultural similarities 
and ties  (Kalotay, 2005; Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė, 2005) and facilitated by the  economic 
integration in the area (Kalotay, 2004). On the other hand, in Russia, ‘insider privatisation’ allowed 
the concentration of assets in the hands of a few oligarchs who could exploit these new financial 
resources through investing abroad (Kalotay, 2008).  We thus formulate: 
 
H2b: OFDI is positively associated with large scale privatisation reforms. 
 
Enterprise restructuring-an institutional reform that complemented the privatisation process- 
increased the efficiency, productivity and profitability of firms, leading to additional financial 
resources that could be used to expand abroad via OFDI (Kalotay, 2004). Efficiency and 
productivity became significant ownership advantages for transition economies-based firms. These 
ownership advantages were exploited by  expanding in other economies that were less advanced 
institutionally and hence had less competitive domestic firms. These newly developed ownership 
advantages complement other ‘embedded’ ownership advantages, such as the experience of 
operating in ‘institutional voids’ (Ramamurti, 2009;  Khanna and Palepu, 2006)- as most CEECs 
firms would have experienced such institutional voids in the early years of the transition. Overall, 
these combined ownership advantages encouraged firms from the CEECs to invest internationally, 
mainly in other transition economies or in developing economies.  Furthermore, as part of enterprise 
restructuring, domestic firms reconfigured their supply chains to ensure efficiency and outward FDI 
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was one way to do so. Through OFDI, CEECs  firms serve additional markets -often in the 
neighbouring countries (Rugraff, 2010)- via sales subsidiaries. As part of the restructuring process, 
MNEs from the CEECs also use OFDI to  access natural resources in other transitional economies 
or in developing economies (UNCTAD, 2011). Several MNEs from the CEECs invest abroad for 
efficiency seeking motives (Rugraff, 2010), also as part of the enterprise restructuring institutional 
reforms, although this motivation is less prevalent due to the cost advantages that many of the 
countries in the area still enjoy. We thus formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2c: OFDI is positively associated with enterprise restructuring reforms. 
 
Both privatisation and enterprise restructuring are part of a wider mix of institutional 
reforms implemented throughout post-communist economies in order to ensure the transition from 
centrally planned to market economies, by putting in place market mechanisms (EBRD, 2011). 
These institutional reforms also include: small scale privatisation, price liberalisation, trade and 
foreign exchange, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities 
markets and non-bank financial institutions (EBRD, 2011). Although these institutional reforms 
were also a requirement for joining the European Union (Stoian, 2007), they have been adopted 
throughout the CEECs, regardless of the country’s relationship with the EU (EBRD, 2011). Overall 
institutional reforms are part of the institutional context  and reflect the competitiveness  and the 
level of economic development of the economy. The more advanced the overall institutional 
reforms, the more efficient the allocation of resources in the economy and the more competitive the 
domestic companies become. This increased competitiveness as a result of advanced reforms leads 
to enhanced  entrepreneurial confidence and increased investment, both in the domestic market and 
abroad (Andreff, 2002). Furthermore, advanced institutional reforms and adoption of market 
economy institutions attract FDI  (Stoian and Vickerman, 2006; Bevan et al.  2004) by minimising 
uncertainty and costs related to the understanding and following the ‘rules of the game’. MNEs that 
target CEECs as a result of advanced institutional reforms can then  use these countries as 
springboards for investment  in other markets (Rugraff, 2010) that are riskier but where knowledge 
and experience of operating in the CEECs can be leveraged. We thus put forward the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2d: OFDI is positively associated with overall institutional reforms. 
 
Finally, whilst advanced institutional reforms are associated with ownership advantages for 
MNEs from CEECs, institutional disadvantages can also turn into competitive or ownership 
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advantages (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). Using data for Russian OFDI, Kalotay (2008) argues that 
emerging multinationals derive competitiveness from their oligopolistic or monopolistic advantages 
in their home markets, as a result of ‘insider privatisation’ and imperfect competition.  Such 
ownership advantages include significant financial resources, access to cheap loans and other 
financial incentives economies of scale or  privileged access to information and networks. In line 
with Hymer (1960), emerging multinationals use these oligopolistic or monopolistic advantages 
when expanding abroad and generating OFDI for their home country. However, research also 
shows that some emerging multinationals invest abroad to escape from the very competitive home 
country environment (Yamakawa et al., 2008; Andreff, 2003) that results from advanced reforms 
regarding competition policy. Alternatively, strong rivalry encourages innovation, enhances the 
competiveness of domestic companies and facilitates OFDI (Porter, 1990) that exploits knowledge 
based ownership advantages. However, as many emerging and transition economies lag behind with 
regard to their innovative capabilities, such a driver of OFDI from the CEECs may be less 
important.  We thus formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2e: OFDI is positively associated with less advanced competition reforms. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample description and data 
To test our conceptual framework we use a panel data set for 15 years and 20 post-communist 
economies (the CEECs). The transitional aspect of these economies makes the CEECs an ideal 
context to test the limits of applicability of extant theories and extend them (Meyer and Peng, 
2005). Furthermore, the variety of institutional contexts across the sample allows us to draw lessons 
with regard to the institutional reforms that ‘matter’ for OFDI. This ensures the timeliness of our 
investigation and its  relevance to both theory and practice. Our focus on a particular region is 




We include in the sample the following countries which are considered as Central and 
Eastern European economies (UNCTAD, 2011; EBRD, 2010a) and for which the EBRD (2010b) 
has calculated its transition indicators: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  
These countries have attracted significant FDI, especially  in the manufacturing sector (food 
and  beverage, motor vehicles, and chemicals), followed by services and the primary sector 
                                                 
2
 For a further justification of our  focus on post-communist  economies, please see the ‘Introduction’. 
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(UNCTAD, 2011). Most FDI originates from developed economies, although the CEECs  are 
increasingly targeted by other CEECs  or developing  economies (UNCTAD, 2011). The CEECs 
have also generated OFDI, especially targeting other transition economies or developing ones 
(UNCTAD, 2011).  According to our data (GMID, 2011),  all countries in our sample  are in the 
stage 2 of the IDP, apart from Russia, which is in stage 3.  Furthermore, FDI is expected to increase, 
driven by investor friendly policies, new rounds in privatisation and stronger commodity prices 
(UNCTAD, 2011).  This increase in FDI is likely to affect positively OFDI in the area, thus further 
ensuring the timeliness and relevance of our research. 
We use country level data from two datasets: Passport GMID (for development related 
variables and control variables) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) database (for institutional variables). The variables are described in Table 1. The exact 
description of the EBRD indicators is presented in the Appendix C. Our data covers fifteen years, 
from 1996 to 2010. This data covers the main transition period when wide range institutional 
reforms were carried out (EBRD, 2011) and when firms from this geographical area have engaged 
in OFDI (GMID, 2011).   
1996 is justified as a starting point by the fact that in the early years of the economic 
transition in the CEECs the political and economic instability prevented OFDI (Rugraff, 2010; 
Blanke-Ławinczk, 2009; Andreff, 2002). Furthermore, in the early 1990s, OFDI was also 
insignificant as a result of the negative public opinion that associated OFDI with capital flight 
(Andreff, 2002) and potential negative effects on the home economy. Moreover,  as the early 1990s 
were dominated by efforts to achieve  macroeconomic stabilisation, the main significant  progress 
in institutional reforms started only in the mid-1990s (Sinn, 1997).  
2010 is justified as the end point as  2010 is the last year for which we have  access to data 
across all variables relevant to the analysis. However, this sample allows us to include a few years 
that were dominated by the global financial crisis and to test whether the financial crisis has 
affected OFDI from the CEECs.  Furthermore, despite the global financial crisis, OFDI from 
transition economies has increased considerably in 2010 and continued to target mainly other  
emerging economies (including both transition and developing markets) (UNCTAD, 2011).  
Moreover, although some CEECs have joined the European Union (in 2004 and 2007 respectively), 
institutional reforms and transition are not yet completed, and some countries- especially the 
members of the Commonwealth Independent States- are still lagging behind with regard to 
institutional reforms, yet generate significant OFDI.  This further ensures the timeliness and the 
continued relevance of this research. Finally, from practical point of view, this sample size allows  




Our dependent variable, OFDI, is measured using OFDI flows rather than the net investment 
position, because of the potential loss of information associated with using the net investment 
position (Durán and Ubeda, 2005). An increase in the net investment position can occur either as a 
result of the increase in OFDI based on increased competitiveness of the home country, or as a 
result of the decrease in FDI, based on the loss of attractiveness of the home country (Durán and 
Udeda, 2005). Also, two similar net positions could result from two very different scenarios: least 
developed countries that neither attract, nor generate FDI or on the contrary, advanced economies 
that generate and attract very high but equal amounts of outward and inward FDI (Durán and 
Ubeda, 2005). Hence, our  dependent variable is LOFDIFLO. 
In line with our conceptual framework, we use two sets of independent variables. Our first 
set of variables relate to the IDP and the economic development of the home country. These are 
GDP per capita (LGDPCAP) (capturing the economic development), percentage of R&D 
expenditure in GDP (LRDGDP) (capturing the technological development) and the annual inflows 
of foreign direct investment (LFDIINF) (capturing the inward FDI and the country’s ability to 
attract FDI). Our second set of variables includes institutional variables. We use the EBRD (2010b) 
transition indicators that capture the progress that post-communist economies make in conducting 
institutional reforms. These variables include: trade and foreign exchange  liberalisation reforms 
(TRA) (capturing the progress in reforms relating to trade and foreign exchange), large scale 
privatisation reforms (LSP) (capturing the progress in the privatisation of large firms), enterprise 
restructuring reforms (ENT), (capturing the progress in the restructuring of large firms), overall 
reforms (REF) (an average of all reform related EBRD transition indicators, capturing the progress 
in overall institutional reforms) and competition reforms (COMP) (capturing the progress in 
reforms relating to competition). These indicators are measured on a scale from 1 to 4.75  and their 
definitions are  described in detail in  Appendix C. 
Drawing on extant literature, we control for a number of factors of potential relevance for 
OFDI. We use dummy variables to control for countries’ membership of the European Union 
(EUJOIN1 and EUJOIN2) or  their membership of the Commonwealth of Independent State 
(CIS),  based on the likely institutional effects such membership has on countries. As it is generally 
accepted that an undervalued exchange rate encourages exports but discourages outward FDI (Goh 
and Wong, 2011; Tolentino, 2010; Pantelidis and Kyrkilis, 2005; Stevens,1993) we control for 
exchange rate (LEXCHDOL). We also control for population (LPOP).
3
 Despite mixed evidence in 
the literature (Andreff, 2002; Varblane et al., 2001; Chudnovsky and Lopez, 2000), researchers 
                                                 
3
 We ran several estimations including also GDP growth as a control variable, but this was not significant. We hence 
excluded this variable from our final estimations. 
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have suggested that larger home markets lead to higher OFDI (Andreff, 2002) as these markets 
allow for ownership advantages derived from economies of scale.  
In line with previous research, the variables (apart from the dummies and the EBRD 
indicators) are transformed into natural logarithms,  assuming non-linear relationships (Buckley et 
al., 2007). Table 1 provides an overview of the variables, their measurement and the respective data 
source. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
 
4.3. Analytical approach 
Similarly to Buckley et al. (2007), we use two statistical models to estimate our equations: 
pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and the random effects (RE) generalised least squares 
method. We conduct the Lagrangian multiplier test (LM) to identify whether POLS or RE provides 
the better model. As the value for the LM test is significantly different from 0 we conclude that the 
RE estimation is preferable to POLS. Also, for the equations that do not include time dummies we 
find that the Hausman test also indicates that the RE model is appropriate (as opposed to the fixed 
effects method).
4
 We thus report only the results for the estimations using the RE method below. 
The random effects method allows us to include time dummies in our estimations. Furthermore, the 
random effects method allows us to generalise our results beyond the sample used in the analysis. In 
order to assess the value of complementing IDP-based explanations with explanations based on 
institutional theory, we run models containing (1) only IDP-variables (Model 1), (2) IDP and  
control variables (non-related to institutions) (Model 2) and (3) IDP, control and institutional 
variables (Models 3 to 7) (Table 2). 
 
5. Results and discussion  
The correlation matrix (Appendix D) shows that there are no problems with the data. The following 
table shows the results of our regressions. Our coefficients are robust throughout all our models. 
Furthermore, comparing model 1 with model 2 and models 3 to 7, Table 2 shows an increase in the 
explained variance (adjusted R square) for the augmented IDP model as compared to the pure IDP 
model. This supports out argument that the IDP model can be enhanced by taking into account 
institutional variables and drawing on institutional theory. 
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
                                                 
4
 We are aware of the methodological challenges when testing the IDP (Liu et al., 2005). However, our models differ 
from Liu et al. (2005) as we estimate OFDI flows rather than stocks. 
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More specifically, we find that two of the IDP related variables are significant and have the 
expected sign. In tune with the propositions of the IDP (Dunning, 1981, 1986, 1988), countries with 
higher level of economic development and hence higher GDP per capita generate higher OFDI 
flows. Also, OFDI is associated with higher FDI. This suggests that local firms have developed 
ownership advantages that they can exploit through investing abroad. These advantages may be a 
result of advanced infrastructure that is associated with a higher level of a country’s economic 
development or with spillovers from foreign investors. Furthermore, foreign investors may drive 
OFDI through establishing regional centres in various CEECs and using some CEECs as 
springboards for further investment in neighbouring countries. This is consistent with findings by 
Rugraff (2010), Ginevičius and Tvaronavičienė (2005) and Andreff (2002). We thus find support 
for hypotheses H1a and H1c.  
However, contrary to our  expectations, we find that outflows of foreign direct investment 
are associated with lower percentage of R&D expenditure in GDP, and hence lower technological 
development of the country (LRDGDP is significant but has a negative sign). This is a very 
interesting finding and helps ‘contextualise’ the IDP for the CEECs. It appears that in post-
communist economies technological development per se does not enhance OFDI. This may reflect 
budget constraints under which most post-communist economies have been operating since the 
beginning of transition. These budget constraints reduced the percentage of R&D in GDP and hence 
the firms’ reliance on R&D as a competitive advantage. Indeed, much of the investment originating 
in the CEECs targets CEECs or developing markets (UNCTAD, 2011)- with similar budget 
constraints. Hence, out-dated technologies are more suitable for transferring across (Salehizadeh, 
2007). Furthermore, some of the OFDI from the CEECs occurs in the  primary sector (UNCTAD, 
2011; Andreff, 2002) and is asset seeking and hence does not rely on the multinationals’ R&D as a 
competitive advantage. The fact that our dummy CIS is significant and positive also appears to 
reflect this latter understanding, as the CIS states are less technologically advanced, resource rich, 
and have recently generated significant OFDI (UNCTAD, 2011; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010). We 
thus do not find support for hypothesis H1b. 
If technological development per se does not enhance OFDI, then do institutions matter? We 
now discuss the results for the institutional variables. In tune with our expectations, we find that 
OFDI is associated with advanced overall institutional reforms (REF is significant and has a 
positive sign- model 6). For post-communist countries institutional reforms were a means to 
improve their economic development and overall competitiveness (Stoian and Vickerman, 2006). 
Advanced institutional reforms minimise the costs associated with operating  in uncertain 
environments and  complex ‘rules of the game’, allowing multinationals from transition economies 
to develop ownership advantages based on efficiency and productivity. Having previously 
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experienced the  ‘institutional voids’ of their home country -in the early years of transition- 
transitional multinationals can leverage these combined ownership advantages by expanding in 
other emerging economies. These findings complement studies by Ramamurti (2009) and  Khanna 
and Palepu (2006) that argue that emerging multinationals develop ownership advantages based on 
their ability to operate in institutional voids. As overall institutional reforms are a significant 
determinant of OFDI in the CEECs, we are thus able augment the IDP by adding institutional 
development variables. In doing so we complement Wang et al (2012) and Kang and Jiang (2012)  
who show that institutions matter for OFDI from China, but  we show how institutions matter (Peng 
et al., 2008) for OFDI and in particular  in the context of post-communist economies.  
We also show which specific institutions matter for OFDI from the CEECs, complementing 
extant literature (Rugraff, 2010; Andreff, 2002; 2003). We find that advanced reforms with regard 
to competition policy enhance OFDI. This shows that firms that are used to operating in a 
competitive environment in the CEECs develop significant ownership advantages that they can 
exploit by investing abroad. This is in tune with Porter (1990), who argues that rivalry is a crucial 
driver of competitiveness at both national and firm level, thus facilitating OFDI. However, our 
results may also suggest that OFDI from the CEECs is driven by escapist motives, as highly 
competitive environments seem to crowd out investors. This understanding is consistent with 
findings by Andreff (2003).  Our results appear to contradict Kalotay (2008) according to whom 
OFDI from transition economies is driven by monopolists that have acquired significant ownership 
advantages such as economies of scale or preferential access to resources. We thus find support for 
hypothesis H2d but we cannot find support for hypothesis H2e (models 6 and 7). 
 However, the remaining institutional variables (TRA, LSP and ENT) are not significant and 
hence we do not find support for hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c (models 3, 4 and 5). This suggests 
that institutional reforms such as large scale privatisation and enterprise restructuring do not work in 
isolation and hence do not provide the local firms the resources or competitiveness necessary to 
engage in outward FDI. Instead, a concerted approach to institutional reforms is more likely to 
enhance OFDI. These findings complement Andreff (2002:377) according to whom ‘privatisation, 
industrialisation and modernisation have often preceded and triggered [the developing and 
transition MNCs’] internationalisation’.  The fact that TRA is not significant is intriguing, as extant 
literature suggests that trade liberalisation encourages FDI (Blanke-Ławinczk, 2009; Kalotay, 2008, 
2005). However, our results may be influenced by the way this institutional variable is defined and 
by its little variation. Furthermore, the impact of trade liberalisation is captured by other factors 
such as FDI inflows and hence an indirect effect may be assumed. Indeed, FDI can be considered a 
proxy for capital flows liberalisation but also an indication that trade liberalisation is high. This may 
also explain why the dummies EUJOIN1 and EUJOIN2 are not significant determinants of OFDI. 
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Whilst Kalotay (2005) and Blanke-Ławinczk (2009) propose that EU membership enhances OFDI, 
most of the trade and FDI liberalisation occurred before the actual joining the EU, hence the lack of 
a structural change once membership was achieved. 
 Finally, we find that the control variables (LPOP and LEXCHDOL) are significant and 
have the expected signs. In tune with Andreff (2002), we find that larger markets generate larger 
OFDI. This may suggest that local companies develop ownership advantages based on economies 
of scope and scale and on learning about various trends in the market. Furthermore, consistent with 





Implications for theory 
This paper investigates the home country institutional determinants of recent outward foreign direct 
investment from post-communist societies. Our motivation is to test the extent to which mainstream 
theory is applicable to other contexts such as  post-communist economies. As discussed earlier, and 
in line with Meyer and Peng (2005),  we believe that post-communist economies offer an ideal 
context to test the applicability of existent theory, given their unique institutional fabric. We join 
recent research that argues that in order to explain OFDI from emerging economies (including post-
communist economies) extant theoretical frameworks need to be extended (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 
2010; Kalotay, 2008; Buckley et al., 2007).  Drawing on institutional theory, we extend the IDP to 
account for the home country institutional determinants of OFDI from emerging economies, 
including post-communist economies. We then test this new conceptual framework  in a new 
context, by using an up to date and comprehensive panel data set for twenty  CEECs and employing 
a wide range of independent variables in our regression analysis. 
 We find support for the Investment Development Path theory, as OFDI is positively 
associated with both GDP per capita and inward foreign direct investment. Based on the economic 
development of their home country, local firms develop ownership advantages that they can exploit 
through investing abroad. Furthermore, these firms also benefit from spill over effects from foreign 
investors and are able to capitalise on these through OFDI. Moreover, multinationals that invest in 
post-communist economies often establish there regional centres and thus generate OFDI for the 
countries they target. We thus complement findings by Andreff (2002;2003), who also focuses on 
OFDI from transition economies and also contribute to the transition literature (Lavigne, 1999, 
2000; Stiglitz, 1999; Kodolko, 2000). 
                                                 
5
 We also find that the time dummies for 1998 and 2008 (corresponding to the two global financial crises) are not 
significant and hence we do not include them in our estimations. 
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However, contrary to the IDP’s propositions, we find that OFDI is negatively associated 
with the technological level of the home country. This suggests that MNEs from CEECs have 
developed other ownership advantages rather than those based on R&D, perhaps advantages based 
on economies of scope, economies of scale or operating within institutional voids. This may also 
suggest that MNEs from the post-communist economies have less advanced technologies that are 
easier to transfer into other post-communist economies through OFDI (Salehizadeh (2007). In doing 
so, multinationals from post-communist economies turn ownership (technological) disadvantages 
into advantages.  In tune with Andreff (2002), these results suggest that the OFDI from the CEECs 
challenge to some extent the IDP as the structural features inherited from the former centrally -
planned system still prevail in the economy and affect OFDI. Hence,  these results support the view  
that in order to account for the determinants of OFDI from emerging and in particular post-
communist economies the IDP needs to be augmented and contextualised. As the IDP is an 
extension of the eclectic paradigm- which is a ‘holistic yet context specific framework’ (Stoian and 
Filippaios, 2008) - contextualising the IDP appears a valid proposition.  
We augment and contextualise the IDP by drawing on institutional theory and including in 
our model several institutional factors such as trade and foreign exchange liberalisation reforms, 
large scale privatisation reforms, enterprise restructuring,  competition reforms and overall 
institutional reforms. As institutional reforms were necessary to enhance the economic development 
of the former communist states and drive their transition to market economy, we believe that 
institutional variables facilitate a natural extension of the IDP. This is because institutions in the 
CEECs differ significantly from developed economies and affect business strategy (Meyer and 
Peng, 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2000), including OFDI.  By extending the IDP and drawing on 
institutional theory we contribute to extant literature that has already extended the IDP, albeit 
mainly in the context of developed economies (Bellak, 2001; Dunning et al., 2001; Durán and 
Ubeda, 2001) and without drawing on institutional theory. By focusing on the CEECs, we also 
confirm extant theory in a new context (Meyer and Peng, 2005), thus making a contribution to 
theory. In doing so we also contribute to the debate anchored in the institution based view of 
strategy (Peng et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2009)  and answer Peng et al.’s (2008) call to examine how 
institutions affect strategy, including the firm’s internationalisation strategy. Extant literature argues 
that institutional change matters for OFDI but only a few studies (Wang et al., 2012; Kang and 
Jiang, 2012)  show  what  institutional reforms influence OFDI and how.  
In particular, we find that reforms related to competition policy enhance OFDI. Such 
reforms increase the competition in the market and hence lead to higher competitiveness of firms 
and industries, also reflected in increased OFDI. These findings support the extension of the IDP by 
drawing on institutional theory and contrast with Khanna and Palepu (2006) who argue  that MNEs 
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from emerging economies invest abroad as a result of  monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages  
obtained by operating in  uncompetitive environments  in their home countries. Our results are in 
tune with Porter (1990) and Yamakawa et al. (2008) but the operationalisation of this relationship 
represents a unique  theoretical and empirical contribution of this paper. Previous literature has 
accounted for policy change using dummies (Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007), 
proxies (Goh and Wong, 2011) or has used alternative measures of institutional factors 
(Salehizadeh, 2007), such as the ICRG risk variables, for example (Kang and Jiang, 2012).  
We also find that large scale privatisation, enterprise restructuring or trade liberalisation 
alone do not enhance OFDI. Instead, OFDI is enhanced by the home country’s progress in overall 
reforms -including large scale privatisation, small scale privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price 
liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. These overall institutional 
reforms reflect the level of competitiveness and economic development of the home country and 
enhance the ownership advantages of post-communist economies multinationals, allowing them to 
invest abroad. By reflecting the economic development and competitiveness of CEECs, overall 
institutional reforms may also attract FDI from multinationals that can use advanced CEECs as 
springboards for FDI into other CEECs. Extending the IDP by including institutional reforms is 
consistent with Liu et al.’s (2005) argument  that GDP per capita is an incomplete measure of 
economic development and thus supplementary factors that contribute to economic development 
should be included in the IDP. These findings support the theoretical extension of the IDP by 
incorporating institutional theory and answer calls by Dunning and Lundan (2008a) to account for 
institutional factors when examining OFDI from emerging economies. This is another theoretical, 
as well as an empirical contribution of the present study. The EBRD indicators have been used 
before to account for the institutional context of host countries and its impact on FDI (Mishra and 
Daly, 2007; Stoian and Vickerman, 2006), but to our knowledge this is the first study to employ 
these  indicators to account for the home country determinants of  OFDI. 
Contrary to expectations, we find that neither trade liberalisation reforms,  nor EU 
membership  (as a proxy for trade and capital liberalisation) enhance OFDI. However, it is widely 
accepted that many of the promised benefits of EU membership occurred before countries actually 
joined the EU, as the liberalisation of trade and capital was incremental and started in the 1990s 
(Stoian, 2007). Furthermore, EU membership was conditional on countries conducting internal 
institutional reforms (Stoian, 2007) and these appear to have enhanced OFDI. Moreover, as FDI 
inflows enhance OFDI, FDI can be considered a proxy for capital liberalisation, showing that 
capital liberalisation affects OFDI positively. This understanding is in tune with findings for 
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emerging economies by Goh and Wong (2011). The investigation of the impact of EU membership 
on OFDI represents another empirical contribution of this paper. 
 
Implications for policy makers 
Based on our findings we are able to put forward several implications for policy makers. These 
represent this study’s contribution to practice. Although some associate OFDI with capital flight 
(Andreff, 2002), OFDI also brings significant benefits to the home economy (Zhao et al., 2010; 
JIM, 2010; Globeram and Shapiro, 2008; Svetlicic and Rojec, 2003) through increased 
competitiveness, job creation and economic growth. This makes a strong case for policies that can 
encourage OFDI responsibly. Policy makers in post-communist economies should consider 
implementing extensive economic and institutional reforms, including large scale privatisation, 
small scale privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange, 
competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions. Progress in all these areas should be encouraged simultaneously, as overall 
institutional reforms enhance the competitiveness of the local economy and its capacity to generate 
OFDI. Overall institutional reforms also increase the absorptive capacity of the local economy, 
facilitate learning by local firms from multinationals and increase the local firms’ competitive 
advantages necessary to invest abroad. Furthermore, competition policy reforms should be 
promoted, as they also increase the competitiveness of the home firms and their ability to generate 
OFDI.  Institutional reforms should be prioritised ahead of policies to improve R&D (Andreff, 
2003),  as CEECs seem to turn their technological disadvantages into  advantages by investing in 
countries with similar levels of technological development. 
To further  stimulate OFDI, CEECs governments should use financial and fiscal incentives 
to encourage FDI, as many multinationals tend to use CEECs as springboards for investing in 
similar or neighbouring  economies. As explained above, FDI also leads to spill over effects that 
enhance the competitive advantages of local firms and increase OFDI. As higher OFDI is associated 
with higher GDP per capita, in order to encourage OFDI,  governments need to implement policies 
that encourage economic growth. All the above policies are more likely to enhance OFDI in larger 
economies (by population), as these can provide local firms with opportunities to develop 
ownership advantages based on economies of scale and learning from a wide market. Finally, when 
designing policies to enhance OFDI, governments need to make sure that OFDI is encouraged 
responsibly, as large OFDI can lead to capital flight and negative implications for the balance of 




7. Limitations and avenues for further investigation 
This study has focused on post-communist economies with the aim of augmenting and 
contextualising the IDP through the analysis of an extensive panel data. As OFDI originating from 
the CEECs is conducted by both local (internationalised) companies and affiliates of foreign 
multinationals (Andreff, 2002), our model is unable to distinguish between the determinants of each 
of these types of OFDI. Furthermore, due to the rather limited literature in this area, we are unable 
to compare our results to a sufficient number of extant studies on the determinants of OFDI from 
the CEECs. However, this study paves the way for further research that will be able to confirm or 
contrast our findings. In time, future research can expand the database to more recent years to allow 
more insights into the impact of the global financial crisis on OFDI from his area. To further test the 
role of home country institutional determinants in enhancing OFDI,  future  research can use 
alternative  institutional variables related to political and economic risk, political and economic 
freedoms, various aspects of competitiveness, or cultural characteristics. The sample can also be 
expanded to include Asian post-communist economies such as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or other  members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that are 
in transition to market economy and democracy. This study can also be replicated for other subsets 
of emerging economies, such as Latin American, South East- Asian or African countries to establish 
whether OFDI home country institutional determinants vary across these regions. Using bilateral 
OFDI flows, future studies can investigate the interplay between home and host country 
institutional determinants in influencing OFDI from CEECs and other emerging economies, 
focusing on institutional distance. They can also concentrate on OFDI from individual countries, 
leading to more country specific policy recommendations. Finally, other studies can focus on 
acquisitions only -as they are a preferred mode of entry for emerging multinationals (UNCTAD, 
2011)- or can  analyse the role of home country institutional factors in determining entry mode 
choice by multinationals from emerging economies, further answering Peng et al.’s (2008) call for 
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Tables and appendices 
Table 1. Variables, measures and data sources 
Variable Measurement
6
 Data source 
Dependent variable 
Outward FDI Flows of outward FDI from country (LOFDIFLO) Passport GMID (2011). 
Independent variables 
Home country economic 
development (H1a) 
Home country GDP per capita (LGDPCAP) Passport GMID (2011). 
Home country technological level 
(H1b) 
Home country percentage of R&D expenditure in GDP 
(LRDGDP) 
Passport GMID (2011). 
Home country inward direct 
investment flow (H1c) 
Home country inward direct investment annual flows 
(LFDIINFL) 
Passport GMID (2011). 
Home country trade and foreign 
exchange liberalisation reforms 
(H2a) 
Home country trade and foreign exchange 
liberalisation indicator (TRA) (ranges from 1 to 4.75) 
EBRD (2010b). 
Home country privatisation 
reforms (H2b) 
Home country large scale privatisation indicator (LSP) 
(ranges from 1 to 4.75) 
EBRD (2010b). 
Home country enterprise 
restructuring reforms (H2c) 
Home country governance and enterprise restructuring 
indicator (ENT) (ranges from 1 to 4.75) 
EBRD (2010b). 
Home country overall 
institutional reforms (H2d) 
Home country overall reforms indicator (average of 
EBRD’s transition (institutional) indicators) (REF) 
(ranges from 1 to 4.75) 
EBRD (2010b). 
Home country competition 
reforms (H2e) 
Home country competition policy indicator (COMP) 
(ranges from 1 to 4.75) 
EBRD (2010b). 
Control variables 
EU membership 2004 Dummy for (home) countries that joined the EU in 
2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) (1 for years 
since 2004, else 0). (EUJOIN1) 
Author’s own. 
EU membership 2007 Dummy for (home) countries that joined the EU in 
2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) (1 for years since 2007, 
else 0). (EUJOIN2) 
Author’s own. 
CIS membership Dummy for (home) countries membership of CIS 
(Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and the Russian 
Federation) (1, else 0) (CIS) 
Author’s own. 
Exchange rate against US dollar Home country currency exchange rate against dollars 
(LEXCHDOL) 
Passport GMID (2011) 











                                                 
6
 Based on theory and previous studies, the variables are transformed into natural logarithms as we expect non-linearity 
in the relationships (Buckley et al., 2007). 
 
 35 
Table 2. Determinants of OFDI from post -communist economies  














































































































TRA   .13 
(.59) 
    
LSP    .34 
(.20) 
   
ENT     .42 
(.37) 
  
REF      1.05* 
(.67) 
 
















LM test 192.13* 244.52* 181.34* 136.04* 160.12* 155.85* 205.17* 
Hausman 
test 
22.90 8.82 11.03 8.81 8.80 9.51 10.03 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
.69 .74 .78 .79 .79 .79 .78 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* - Significant at 5% level. 










Appendix A.    
Key studies on home country determinants of OFDI from emerging economies 
 
Study Research focus   Theoretical 
framework 




 Findings related to 
institutional factors 






determinants of OFDI from 














Not included. The home country 





Liu et al. 
(2005) 
The macroeconomic 
determinants of OFDI from 
China, with a focus on 
development related 
indicators 
The IDP Panel data 
regression 
analysis 
China, total OFDI Not included. There is no  need to 
extent the IDP by 
including variables that 
capture the distinct 
features of transitional 






determinants of OFDI from 
China and India 
The OLI Panel data 
regression 
analysis 
China and India 
total OFDI 
Not included. It is suggested that 
further research 
focuses on other home 
country and industry 
specific factors. 




institutions and policies that 












It is called for 
convergence between 
two seemingly 





Studies including home country institutional  determinants of OFDI  
Buckley et 
al. (2007) 
The determinants of 
Chinese OFDI, including 
The general 
theory of FDI, 
Panel data 
regression 





home, host country 
determinants and cultural 
and physical distance 
between the home and the 


































There is a positive 
relationship between 
economic freedom and 
political transparency 
on one hand and OFDI 





The dynamics, determinants 
and geographical 















Dummy to reflect 
cultural proximity 
Policy change 
influences the  M&As 
of Russian firms  in 
other countries. 
 
M&As are targeted 
towards  countries that 
are culturally close. 
 Cui and 
Jian (2010) 
The determinants of 
ownership decision by 
Chinese firms with a focus 
on the choice between 
wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WHOs)  and joint ventures 
(JVs)  
An integrative 
framework of the 
resource based 




business strategy  





China, firm level 
data for  ten 
selected firms 
Level of financial 






Perceived level of 
It is proposed  (yet not 
tested) that the level of 




with  the likelihood of 




that the perceived level 
of government 
approval restriction  is 
negatively associated 
with  the likelihood of 
choosing WHOs. 
Voss et al. 
(2010) 
The impact of home country 
institutional effects on the 
internationalisation strategy 














China, firm level 
data for 9 firms 
China’s domestic 
institutions 
It is proposed (yet not 




smaller Chinese firms 
and that these 
institutions developed 





Cui et al. 
(2011) 
The entry-mode decision of 




view, the industry 
based view and 
the institution 







China, firm level 
data for 138 firms 





Different firms react to 
the home country 
institutional 
environment 
differently with regard 
to their entry mode 
choice with state-
owned enterprises 
being more inclined to 




 Goh and 
Wong 
(2011) 
The effects of foreign 
market size and home 
country government policy 










reserves as a proxy 
for capital 
liberalisation 




 Kang and 
Jiang 
(2012) 
The determinants of FDI 
location choice of Chinese 
multinationals in East and 















China, total OFDI Institutional 
distance measures 
such as:  
The difference in 
economic regimes 
between China and 
the host country 
 
The difference in  
political and legal  
regimes between 
China and the host 
country 
 
The difference in 
FDI restriction 
between China and 




China and the host 
economy 
Institutional distance 
related to economic 
freedom, political 
influence or FDI 
restriction affects the 
location of OFDI. 
 
Wang et al. 
(2012) 
The drivers of FDI by 
Chinese firms, including 
firm characteristics and 
home country industry-
















(percentage of state 
owned assets in an 
enterprise) 
 
Dummy variable to 
control for firms 





ownership of firms-  is  









Appendix B.   
Key studies on the home country determinants of OFDI from post-communist economies 
 
Study Research focus   Theoretical 
framework 




 Findings related to 
institutional factors 
Andreff (2002) The macroeconomic 
determinants of OFDI 
from transition and 
developing economies  



















Andreff (2002:377).  
Andreff (2003) The macroeconomic, 
economic development 
and industry structure 
determinants of OFDI 
from post-communist 
economies compared to 
third world OFDI  





















It is suggested (yet not 
tested) that OFDI is 






It is argued that post-
communist economies 
are different from third 
world economies in 
terms of OFDI, hence 
research focused on 
the CEECs is needed. 
 














OFDI patterns and 
development related 
determinants of OFDI 
from Central and Eastern 
Europe, including 
government policies and 
the EU accession 




analysis of total 
OFDI from Central 
and Eastern 
European countries 




It is hypothesised  (yet 
not tested) that the EU 
enlargement fosters 
OFDI,  provided that 
adequate 
governmental policies 
that encourage OFDI 
are put in place. 
 Kalotay 
(2008) 
The determinants of 
OFDI by Russian 
transnationals 
The general 










both country and 














state ownership and  
foreign policy)  
It is suggested the 
need to extend the OLI 
by including  home 
country institutional 
determinants to 










The drivers of successful 
firm internationalisation 











Total OFDI from 
Poland combined 
with industry and 
firm level data and 
analysis (including 






The prospect of EU 
accession 
It is suggested (yet not 
tested) that Polish 
OFDI was enhanced 
by the market-oriented 
reforms of the 
economy and the 




Rugraff (2010) The strengths and 
weaknesses of the OFDI 
paths of Central 
European countries 









Total OFDI and 
industry level data 
for  the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and  
Slovenia 
Not included. NA 
 
 
Appendix C.  
EBRD indicators description 
Indicator 
abbreviation 
Indicator name Description 
TRA Trade and foreign exchange liberalisation 1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign 
exchange. 
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent 
(possibly with multiple exchange rates). 
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; 
almost full current account convertibility. 
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart 
from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in 
exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-
uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full current account 
convertibility. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies; removal of most 
tariff barriers; membership in the WTO. 
LSP Large scale privatisation 1 Little private ownership. 
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 
3 More than 25 per cent of large scale enterprises assets in private hands or in the process 
of being privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the state effectively 
ceded its ownership rights but possible with major unresolved issues regarding corporate 
governance.  
 43 
4 More than 50 per cent of state owned enterprise and farms assets in private ownership 
and significant progress with corporate governance of these enterprises.  
4+ Standards and performance are typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 
75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance. 
ENT Governance and enterprise restructuring 1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline 
at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance. 
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance. 
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote corporate 
governance effectively (for example, privatisation combined with tight credit and subsidy 
policies and/ or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation). 
4 Substantial improvement in corporate governance and significant new investment and 
enterprise level, including minority holdings by financial investors. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering 
market-driven restructuring. 
COMP Competition policy  1 No competition legislation and institutions. 
2 Competition policy and legislation set up; some reduction of entry restrictions or 
enforcement action on dominant firms. 
3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and promote a competitive 
environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial reduction of 
entry restrictions. 
4 Significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets. 









Appendix D.   
Correlation matrix  
 
   LOFDIFLO  LGDPCAP   LRDGDP LFDIINFL    LSP      SSP     TRA      REF      LPOP   LEXCHDOL  EUJOIN2 EUJOIN1  CIS 
LOFDIFLO  1.00000    
 LGDPCAP   .63687  1.00000    
  LRDGDP   .47575   .54329  1.00000    
LFDIINFL   .72060   .38019   .25755  1.00000    
     LSP   .41402   .37992  -.01067   .32776  1.00000   . 
     SSP   .43607   .46585   .08004   .23336   .81571  1.00000    
     TRA   .20753   .38096  -.14210   .13328   .79590   .80285  1.00000    
     REF   .51047   .61573   .12663   .36113   .89480   .87646   .86120  1.00000 
    LPOP   .41532  -.15002   .21398   .61327  -.13093  -.15604  -.35875  -.19774  1.00000   
LEXCHDOL  -.06537  -.05876   .04725   .09462  -.43611  -.48499  -.53387  -.43320   .31849  1.00000 
 EUJOIN2   .08045   .06379  -.09807   .18565   .13387  -.03685   .09114   .08341   .07104   -.10474  1.00000 
 EUJOIN1   .42319   .58255   .24670   .18091   .34709   .33748   .29337   .51149  -.18912   -.22537   .10776  1.00000 
    CIS1  -.01563  -.50982   .02011   .03988  -.44061  -.46412  -.62397  -.58638   .52616    .31962  -.09514  -.27959 1.00000  
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